| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w10084
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 10084
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| Labor Versus Capital in Trade-Policy Determination: The Role of General-Interest and Special-Interest Politics |
| Pushan Dutt; Devashish Mitra
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| 发表日期 | 2003-11-10
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Trade policy depends on the extent to which the government wants to redistribute income as well as on a country's overall factor endowments and their distribution. While the government's desire to redistribute income itself is dependent on asset distribution, it is to a large extent also driven by the partisan nature of the government, i.e., whether it is pro-labor or pro-capital. Using cross-country data on factor endowments, inequality and government orientation, we find that, conditional on inequality, left-wing (pro-labor) governments will adopt more protectionist trade policies in capital-rich countries, but adopt more pro-trade policies in labor-rich economies than right-wing (pro-capital) ones. Also higher inequality is associated with higher protection in capital-abundant countries while it is associated with lower protection in labor-abundant countries. These results are consistent with the simultaneous presence of both general- as well as special-interest politics as determinants of protection within a two-factor, two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Overall, various statistical tests support an umbrella model (that combines both the general-interest as well as special-interest models) over each of the individual models. |
| 主题 | International Economics
; Trade
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10084
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567712
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Pushan Dutt,Devashish Mitra. Labor Versus Capital in Trade-Policy Determination: The Role of General-Interest and Special-Interest Politics. 2003.
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文件名：
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w10084.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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