| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10002 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10002 |
| Kidney Exchange | |
| Alvin E. Roth; Tayfun Sonmez; M. Utku Unver | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-09-29 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor-patient pair makes a donation to someone on the queue for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving the highest priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. We explore how such exchanges can be arranged efficiently and incentive compatibly. The problem resembles some of the housing' problems studied in the mechanism design literature for indivisible goods, with the novel feature that while live donor kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, the cadaver kidneys must be transplanted immediately upon becoming available. In addition to studying the theoretical properties of the design we propose for a kidney exchange, we present simulation results suggesting that the welfare gains would be substantial, both in increased number of feasible live donation transplants, and in improved match quality of transplanted kidneys. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10002 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567612 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alvin E. Roth,Tayfun Sonmez,M. Utku Unver. Kidney Exchange. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10002.pdf（767KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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