全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w1759
来源ID	Working Paper 1759
	The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency
	Joel Slemrod; Shlomo Yitzhaki
发表日期	1985-10-01
出版年	1985
语种	英语
摘要	This paper addresses the optimal degree of law enforcement regarding tax evasion. It derives the conditions that characterize the optimal size of a tax collection agency, and then provides a simple interpretation of the conditions in terms of excess burden.The paper clarified earlier findings that suggest that the optimal size should be set higher than a simple cost-benefit calculation would indicate. It concludes with a numerical example that illustrates the optimality condition and demonstrates that a policy based on a naive cost-benefit analysis of the tax collection agency could result in a substantial overcommitment of resources.
主题	Macroeconomics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w1759
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559003
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Joel Slemrod,Shlomo Yitzhaki. The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency. 1985.