| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14654 |
| DP14654 Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking | |
| Guglielmo Barone; Fabiano Schivardi; Enrico Sette | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-09 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 16 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment and sales. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Interlocking directorates Competition Banking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14654-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546067 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guglielmo Barone,Fabiano Schivardi,Enrico Sette. DP14654 Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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