全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP16506 All-Pay Auctions with Two Heterogenous Prizes and Partially Asymmetric Players

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP16506
	DP16506 All-Pay Auctions with Two Heterogenous Prizes and Partially Asymmetric Players
	Aner Sela; Ofer Levi; David Lagziel; Chen Cohen
发表日期	2021-09-02
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	We study complete information all-pay contests with n players and two heterogeneous prizes with distinct values. Among the players, n - 1 are symmetric (i.e., they evaluate the prizes in a similar manner), whereas the remaining player has different valuations than his opponents for each of the prizes. Our analysis focuses on the equilibrium profiles and expected payoffs for the case of three players, and we partially extend our analysis for cases with additional players. Our results show that in all-pay auctions with heterogeneous prizes, the ordering of the players according to their expected payoffs in equilibrium might vary significantly, depending on both prizes. In particular, although the values for the first (larger) prize have the greatest effect on the identity of the players with positive expected payoffs, the value of the second prize might have a non-negligible effect.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	All-pay contests Multiple prizes Complete information
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp16506
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545461
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Aner Sela,Ofer Levi,David Lagziel,et al. DP16506 All-Pay Auctions with Two Heterogenous Prizes and Partially Asymmetric Players. 2021.