A woman holds her malnourished boy at a therapeutic feeding center in northern Yemen (Reuters)
As drones and cruise missiles made their way 1,200
kilometers to strike
Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in the north-east of Saudi Arabia, a day
earlier Houthi fighters were carrying out raids
in the Jizan region of Saudi Arabia. While the frequency of the Houthi drone
and missile attacks on Saudi’s neighboring regions—namely Jazan, Asir and
Najran, as well as targets up in the north from Mecca to Riyadh—has increased
and caused political and physical damage in Saudi Arabia, so are the land-based
incursions on the Saudi-Yemeni border. Meanwhile, a largely underreported
environmental and humanitarian war is poised to take over. It will likely increase
the frequency of humanitarian influx of Yemenis into Saudi Arabia.
The conflict in Yemen is one of the world’s largest
humanitarian catastrophes and is caught up in a cycle of conflict,
environmental degradation, water, energy and food insecurity. The
water-energy-food insecurity nexus is one of the causes and a continuing result
of the current
Yemeni conflict. Saudi Arabia is accustomed to playing against known state
actors and non-state actors—such as the Iranians or Houthis—and accounting for
their actions and interests. However, it is not aware that it is also battling the
environment in Yemen, and the consequences of exacerbating the
water-energy-food insecurity nexus.
A classic example of a developing country facing
climate change, Yemen is also plagued with natural resource scarcity—water,
oil, and arable land—coupled with chronic natural resource mismanagement.
It has long been flagged as one of the most water-stressed countries for decades;
with ominous predictions that Sanaa would be one of the first capitals in the
world to be deserted for drought.
Energy resources
Yet, the newest wave of conflict in Yemen, that fueled
and legitimized the Houthi takeover, was due to the removal
of energy subsidies by the Hadi government that heightened the cost of water
extraction and fueled food price inflation. The removal of energy subsidies was
due to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations—in the quest by
the government, led by Yemeni President Abdrabbo Mansour Hadi, to access loans—and
based on the IMF belief
that the energy subsidy provided blanket aid that did not reach its intended
targets and “which in 2013 accounted for about 7 percent of GDP, nearly 60
percent of the country’s hydrocarbon revenue, and more than 20 percent of total
public expenditures.”
Water and food insecurity
Beginning with the Yemeni civil war that continued decades
of ill-governance, corruption bred by tribal rivalry, and environmental
degradation, almost two thirds of the Yemeni population—a staggering nineteen million
Yemenis—are now suffering from clean water shortage and sanitation access.
Around twenty-six million Yemenis—80 percent of the population—are in need of
assistance, with around eleven million children in need of support. The latest
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) data up to January 2019 show
that 15.9 million people—around 53 percent of the population—are facing acute food
insecurity.
Climate migration
While the recent war has created
around 3.65 million IDPs, there is an unaccounted internal migration from the
south to north, and from rural to urban areas, fueled by the conflict, water,
and food insecurity. Analysis of available data shows a correlation between change
in active agricultural area
(areas under cultivation) between 2014 and 2017 and the rapid displacement tracking with movement of the displaced
to the north. With the decrease in proportion of active agricultural areas
between 2014 and 2017, there was an increase in movement of displaced Yemenis
both within and to other governorates.
Fertile agricultural areas such as the Tihama region
in Alhudayda and the governorate of Ibb have suffered significant reduction in
the proportion of active agricultural area, while governorates to the north
including Dhamar, Sanaa, and even Saadah reported an increase in active
agricultural areas in the same period.
The data on active agricultural area is also
complemented by the data on the proportion of fallow agricultural area
between 2014 and 2017, which shows a growing trend in proportion of fallow
agricultural areas in the major conflict governorates such as Taiz, Alhudayda,
Ibb and Hajjah. Yet, the opposite occurred in governorates receiving IDPs, such
as Sanaa, Dhamar and Saadah which saw a decrease.
Field evidence
from the Tihama region confirms that the increasing price of energy cost of
transport or irrigation pumps operation and water scarcity caused by
destruction of water structures, have significantly affected agriculture and
contributed to food insecurity in the area.
The northern migration
With agriculture employing more than 50 percent of the
working force, the decline of agricultural activity due to environmental changes
in addition to conflict is only pushing the population to migrate internally
either in search of new agricultural opportunities, or to join the conflict as
fighters. With 90 percent of Yemen classed as arid, semi-arid,
or desert, the environmental war in Yemen will force the population to migrate north
across the Saudi-Yemeni border.
Yemeni tribes are already present on both
sides of the northern border. The Banu Hamadan clan—which includes the Yam, Bakil, and Hashid tribes—are spread across Al Jawf, Saadah, and Hajjah in northern Yemen
and populate the regions of Najran and Asir in Saudi Arabia. Banu Al-Hakam and
Khawlan are divided between Hajjah in Yemen and Jazan in Saudi Arabia. The
Methhij clan in Yemen—under which several
tribes are included in the governorate of Hajjah—are part of the larger Qahtan clan of Saudi Arabia, which populates Asir
region in southwestern Saudi Arabia, north of Yemen.
Although the 1934 Treaty of Taif between Yemen and Saudi Arabia during the colonial British mandate relinquished the regions of Assir, Jizan, and Najran to the Saudis in return of Saudi withdrawal from Hodeidah and the Tihama coastline, many Houthis claim to have lost Yemeni territory during the reign of the penultimate Zaidi Imam Ahmad bin Yehya—who ruled the Mutawakkilit kingdom of Yemen before it split into the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) during the Yemen civil war—hence the reason they continue this ideological war against Saudi to reclaim it.
The ongoing conflict fostered by the Houthis
further pushes
thousands
of migrants from the Horn of Africa to Saudi Arabia
and the other GCC countries. They have also conducted raids into Saudi Arabia,
most recently into Najran claiming the capture
of 2,000 soldiers and mercenaries. With the
food-water-energy insecurity pressure mounting and the corresponding migration
to the north, it may be to the advantage of the Houthis to allow a humanitarian
influx of Yemenis into Saudi Arabia to throw off its adversary preceding any
military movement.
How it began
Saudi Arabia led a coalition into the civil war in
Yemen in 2015 with an objective to decisively end the Houthi crawl on
government and power in Yemen, stabilize the government against any renewed
Arab Spring-style revolution, and neutralize the potential threat of Iran
establishing a foothold in its backyard. Four years later, Saudi Arabia has
found itself trapped in an endless war with an ever-evading political solution
or military victory.
While Saudi Arabia came into Yemen very sensitive of
the regional Iranian challenge and Houthi threat, its war strategy and foreign
policy lacks any awareness of the looming and ongoing environmental and
humanitarian war that will affect the overall outcome of the peace in
Yemen.
Before it jumps into finding solutions for the war
with Iran and the Houthis, it needs to start addressing the environmental and
humanitarian war at hand. Cutting oil exports
to Yemen, weaponization of water, destruction of food supply chains, hampering
of food and agricultural assistance are all counterproductive moves by Saudi
Arabia. It will only increase the water-energy-food insecurity nexus and induce
the environmental and humanitarian war in Yemen which will perpetuate the
conflict.
Hadi Fathallah is director for Levant and Gulf Cooperation Council at NAMEA Group. He is also a fellow at the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs, and a Global Shaper, an initiative of the World Economic Forum. Follow him on Twitter: @Hadi_FAO.
Fri, Jan 25, 2019
When Yemen’s last peace talks in Stockholm took place in December 2018, only one female delegate was at the negotiation table. Assistant Secretary of the Yemeni Popular Nasserist Party, Rana Ghanem was the only female member, in the Yemeni government delegation. Over the past three Yemen peace talks, only three women have sat at the negotiation table.
MENASource
by
Afrah Nasser
Wed, Oct 3, 2018
When over $2 billion was pledged for the 2018 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) earlier this year, it was considered not only a success but also the best funded response plan worldwide according to anonymous aid workers who spoke to the author during the UN General Assembly. So far, 65% of the pledged funds have been delivered. The delivery of the remaining funding is expected throughout this year.
MENASource
by
Afrah Nasser
Thu, Nov 29, 2018
In a piece published last year, I examined the interaction of water and conflict in Yemen and Syria, two countries whose severe water shortages have enabled competing actors to wield this precious resource as a weapon in violent conflict to the detriment of millions of civilians.
MENASource
by
Margaret Suter
While Saudi Arabia came into Yemen very sensitive of the regional Iranian challenge and Houthi threat, its war strategy and foreign policy lacks any awareness of the looming and ongoing environmental and humanitarian war that will affect the overall outcome of the peace in Yemen.
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